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Growing consensus within international criminal law (ICL) scholarship attests to the field’s maturity 
not simply as a site of practice within international criminal tribunals (ICTs), but also, academia.1 
This growing body of scholarly work is overwhelmingly characterised by studies focussing on the 
normative evolution of the ICL regime as played out within the practice of ICTs.2 Many of the 
authors of such accounts are themselves practitioners, underscoring the particular importance of 
doctrinal scholarship that is faithfully wedded to internal accounts of the law. Yet the significance of 
ICT practice has also been of interest to a number of scholars beyond the legal field, particularly, in 
the disciplines of criminology,3 sociology,4 international relations5, socio-legal studies,6 geography7 
and anthropology8. Typically, there is very little engagement between ICL scholarship and these 
other disciplines; different research questions,9 methods and sites of publication ensure that 
interdisciplinarity within and of ICL is rare. This is not unusual of course. Interdisciplinarity is 
frustratingly difficult, if not impossible,10 if we understand it as a synthesis of two disciplines that 
produces a new approach. Law’s normativity ensures that legal scholars tend to begin their inquiry 
with the rules without first thinking about how such rules emerged, how they relate to broader 
social and political agendas and what ‘problems’ they constitutively imagine and define. Partly too 
this is a matter of intellectual division of labour. Scholars of ICL can’t be expected to be expert in the 
law and practice of ICL while also competent in historical, social science and anthropological 
                                                          
* Thanks to Nesam McMillan and Christoph Sperfeldt for their comments and to Sascha Kouvelis for research 
assistance for this article and the special issue as a whole. This research was funded by the Australian Research 
Council.  
1 D. Luban, ‘After the Honeymoon: Reflections on the Current State of International Criminal Justice’, 11 
Journal of International Criminal Justice (2013) 505-515. 
2 K. Anderson, ‘The Rise of International Criminal Law: Intended and Unintended Consequences’ 20 European 
Journal of International Law (2009) 331-358. 
3 For example: J. Hagan et al., ‘Swaying the Hand of Justice: The Internal and External Dynamics of Regime 
Change at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’ 31 Law & Social Inquiry (2006) 585-
616.  
4 For example: M. Madsen, ‘The New Sociology of International Courts’ 4(10) ESIL Reflections (2015), 
available at http://www.esil-sedi.eu/node/1169.  
5 For example: K. W. Abbott, ‘International Relations Theory, International Law, and the Regime Governing 
Atrocities in Internal Conflicts’ 93 American Journal of International Law (1999) 361-379; and D. Wippman, 
‘The International Criminal Court’, C. Reus-Smit (ed.), The Politics of International Law (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 2004), pp.151-188.  
6 For example: R. Byrne, ‘Drawing the Missing Map: What Socio-Legal Research Can Offer to International 
Criminal Trial Practice’ 26 Leiden Journal of International Law (2013) 991-1007.  
7 For example: R. Hughes, ‘Ordinary theatre and extraordinary law at the Khmer Rouge Tribunal’ 
33 Environment and Planning D - Society & Space (2015) 714-731. 
8 For example: K. Clarke, Fictions of Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Challenge of Legal 
Pluralism in Sub-Saharan Africa (Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
9 J. Rowen and J. Hagan, ‘Using Social Science to Frame International Crimes’, 10 Journal of 
International Law and International Relations (2014) 92-106, p. 100. 
10 This is the case for Stanley Fish who argues that the scholar is too indoctrinated into a particular mindset to 
work outside it. Discussed in D. W. Vick, ‘Interdisciplinarity and the Discipline of Law’ (2004) 31 Journal of 
Law & Society 163-193, p. 189.  
approaches.11 Interdisciplinary can also seem threatening as it undermines a discipline’s claim to 
epistemic authority.  
This special issue reflects the truncated possibilities then of truly interdisciplinary scholarship as it 
does not seek to remake the ICL wheel altogether or showcase work that can perfectly fuse a 
number of disciplines in a single article.12 Notwithstanding such circumspection, however, as guest 
editors, we consider interdisciplinarity within ICL as an important and ongoing endeavour for 
enriching ICL scholarship and to forge closer bonds between ICL scholars and non-legal scholars 
working on ICL. Accordingly, the special issue showcases a range of approaches typically from 
outside the legal discipline – international relations, cultural studies, socio-legal studies and 
sociology (Cynthia Banham, Mikkel Chistensen, Sara Dezalay, Peerce McMannus, Christoph 
Sperfeldt and Immi Tallgren). The special issue also seeks to take seriously the division within ICL 
itself between scholars and practitioners with the contribution of Michelle Jarvis seeking to reach 
out to academia from practice. Finally, not as a discipline, but as a theory, feminism is a particularly 
rich scholarly tradition that could radically reconfigure how we study and practice ICL. Rosemary 
Grey’s contribution, which applies a doctrinal lens to the ICC Statute, illustrates the possibilities 
extant within traditional ICL scholarship.  
In this introduction, I explore interdisciplinarity by first considering law as a discipline to account for 
how ICL has emerged as a field of practice and scholarship within the broader epistemic context of 
law. I then consider the nature of ICL scholarship before turning to questions of interdisciplinarity. 
This introduction acknowledges the work of scholars within ICL who are already conducting 
interdisciplinary scholarship of various kinds and seeks to continue such a tradition by widening 
discussion about the potentialities and pitfalls of such endeavours.13 Ultimately, I argue that the 
best way of capturing ICL’s interdisciplinarity potential is to characterise the field as ‘international 
criminal justice’ (ICJ).  
 
2. The Legal Tradition and the Disciplining of the (International) Lawyer 
Connotations of constraint and control arising from the word ‘discipline’ remind us of the difficulties 
of interdisciplinarity and the importance of accounting for particular scholarly traditions and 
histories. For ‘disciplines are not just distinct bodies of knowledge or branches of learning…but are 
also social communities with members who share “personal experiences, values, and aesthetic 
judgments”’.14 The socialising effects of a discipline are thus profound, because to  
be disciplined ... is to learn to embody, to perform, and to enact on a daily basis, in the 
workplace, as everyday pedagogy, not only the academic genres that constitute the theories 
and practices of the discipline, but also the genres of social relations and embodied 
subjectivity that construct the discipline as 'a body' of knowledge ... To succeed in the 
                                                          
11 P. Roberts and N. McMillan, ‘For Criminology in International Criminal Justice’ 1 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice (2003) 315-338, p.337. Also see  C. Bijleveld, ‘On Research Methods for International Crimes 
– Methodological Issues in the Empirical Study of International Crimes’, A. Smeulers (ed.), Collective Violence 
and International Criminal Justice: An Interdisciplinary Approach (Hart, Oxford, 2010), 275-296. 
12 In her article here, Tallgren makes a very similar point regarding her contribution as being illustrative of the 
directions possible within interdisciplinary ICL scholarship: I. Tallgren, ‘Come and See? The Power of Images 
and International Criminal Justice’ issue? International Criminal Law Review (2017) pages?  
13 In particular, see A. Smeulers (ed.), Collective Violence and International Criminal Justice: An 
Interdisciplinary Approach (hart, Oxford, 2010).  
14 Vick, quoting Nissani, supra note 10, p. 166. 
discipline means to be able to perform its genres, and to speak and write and embody its 
favourite discourses, myths, and narratives.15 
 Before thinking specifically about ICL, it is useful to consider briefly the discipline of law and then 
international law in general, so as to appreciate internal divisions and controversies as well as 
account for how and why legal scholarship is distinct from other subjects in the humanities and 
social sciences.  
Law as an academic discipline is distinct from other disciplines in the academy for a number of 
reasons, but the most important is its often-dependent relationship to practice. This also ensures 
that law is able to maintain its distinctive character vis-à-vis other scholarly pursuits in the academy 
as the scholar can justify her craft of textual exegesis and teaching for its support or constructive 
critique and/or reform of the legal system. Yet, such proximity to legal institutions and thus, the 
state, elicits paradoxical reactions in the legal scholar. On the one hand, she can take comfort in the 
real world or ‘pragmatic’ application of her knowledge as legal and political power.16 Yet, it is also 
crucial not to appear too close to power and so the resort to doctrinal or ‘positivist’ work is a way of 
preserving a semblance of neutrality.17  According to Vick, law’s ‘disciplinary core’ entails ‘a doctrinal 
approach involving the use of particular interpretive tools and critical techniques in order to 
systemize and evaluate legal rules and generate recommendations as to what legal rules should 
be.’18  
Doctrinal approaches are dominant in all practice areas, including international law, which has 
nevertheless nurtured its own distinctive culture and language since its evolution as a profession in 
the nineteenth century.19 Operating in a world of power politics, international lawyers tend to share 
a common liberal (and paradoxical) mindset and commitment to preserving individual freedom 
through order.20 Unlike lawyers in the domestic realm, international lawyers are often less 
dependent on the state to enforce order. The end of the Cold War has ushered in a particular 
rendering of such liberal ideals through a number of dominant narratives including ‘heroic 
internationalism and’ humanitarianism,21 which have been seminal in underpinning ICL’s rapid 
contemporaneous rise.22 According to Orford, ‘international lawyers gain an aura of power through 
their ability to translate or interpret the desires and aims of powerful entities, without having to take 
responsibility for the way that the knowledge they produce about such entities creates a particular 
image of the world and makes it seem real.’23 Remaining aloof from power also can lead to 
questioning international law’s relevance, especially in the face of devastating episodes of mass 
                                                          
15 Threadgold, quoted in A. Orford, ‘Embodying Internationalism: The Making of International Lawyers’ 19 
Australian Yearbook of International Law (1998) 1-34, p.3.  
16 M Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law (Hart, Oxford, 2011), p. 292.  
17 Orford (1998), supra note 15, p. 15. 
18 Vick, supra note 10, p. 165.  
19 M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002).  
20 On liberalism, see M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005 [reissued edition]), p. 71; on commitment, see M. Koskenniemi 
(2011), supra note 16, p. 271-293. We can think of liberalism as both a paradigm and a theory informing 
international legal scholarship: M. Burgis-Kasthala, ‘Scholarship as Dialogue? TWAIL and the Politics of 
Methodology’ 14 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2016) 921-937, p. 924.  
21 ‘International lawyers come to understand themselves as the embodiment of heroic internationalism, and of 
the values and myths that underlie international law. The role imagined for international law and international 
lawyers is premised upon an idealism about the capacity to do good through international law.’ Orford (1998), 
supra note 15, p. 16. 
22 See Robinson on the illiberal effects of a liberal ICL tradition: D. Robinson, ‘The identity crisis of 
international criminal law’ 21 Leiden Journal of International Law (2008) 925-963. 
23 Orford (1998), supra note 15, p. 33.  
atrocities.24 What role could law have played in preventing such acts and how can it be used to 
redress them? 
3. ICL as a maturing field and community of scholars/practice? 
These questions have plagued ICL and because of the nature of its jurisdiction centred on some of 
humanity’s worst moments, the stakes for its relevance could not be higher.25 Yet it is this sense of a 
shared project or telos to redressing past atrocities so as to end future ones, that has produced a 
particularly strong sense of commitment and even faith for both practitioners and scholars of ICL.26 
Such a commitment, which is usually unquestioned, has nurtured an ever growing ICL community, 
which although emerging out of international law more broadly, has meant that over time, it has 
developed its own particular set of cultural practices, norms and language. In terms of both norms 
and practice then, it makes sense to think of ICL as a specialised legal regime as well as a (weak) 
scholarly field within the discipline of international law.27 For Anderson, understanding ICL requires 
not only an appreciation of its ‘internal structure’, but how ICL has shaped ‘areas of law, policy and 
politics which are quite outside ICL, and in particular beyond the ICTs’.28 Yet to do this, we need to 
appreciate what is commonly understood as inside and outside of ICL. This is not settled and asking 
such a question goes to the heart of how the discipline of ICL disciplines the way we interpret the 
world.  
There are a number of ways to study a scholarly field or discipline and its framing devices, such as 
through its methodology, its personnel,29 its intended audiences, its constituency or objects of study. 
Perhaps the best way though is to start our enquiry with narrative. By exploring ICL narratives, the 
field’s actors, purpose and approaches to practice and study all become clearer. In studying law and 
narrative, Robert Cover’s contribution is perhaps the most well-known, arguing that only in 
understanding narrative, can we understand law because  
                                                          
24 See M. Nicolson, ‘Walter Benjamin and the Re-Imagineation of International Law’ 27 Law & Critique (2016) 
103-129. 
25 E. Van Sliedregt, ‘International Criminal Law: Over-studied and Underachieving?’ 29 Leiden Journal of 
International Law (2016) 1-12, pp. 3-4.  
26 D.S. Koller, ‘The Faith of the International Criminal Lawyer’, 40 NewYork University Journal of 
International Law and Politics (2008) 1019-1069, p. 1020; and I. Tallgren, ‘Searching for the Historical Origins 
of International Criminal Law’, M. Bergsmo, Wui Ling C. and Y. Ping (eds), Historical Origins of International 
Criminal Law, vol. 1(Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Brussels, 2014), pp. xi–xxx.  
27 Burgis-Kasthala (2016), supra note 20, p. 924; and P. Dixon & C. Tenove, ‘International Criminal Justice as a 
Transnational Field: Rules, Authority and Victims’ 7 International Journal of Transitional Justice 393-413. 
M.Koskenniemi, ‘The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics’ 70 Modern Law 
Review (2007) 1-30, p. 30. Christensen also suggests we understand ICL as a ‘sub-discipline’ as well as field: 
citation.. See Dezalay in this issue on the idea of ICL as a ‘weak field’ as well as her study of the conflict field 
as a weak field S. Dezalay, ‘Lawyering War or Talking Peace? On Militant Usages of the Law in the Resolution 
of Internal Armed Conflicts: A Case Study of International Alert’, Y. Dezalay & B.G. Garth (eds), Lawyers and 
the Construction of Transnational Justice (Routledge, Abingdon, 2012) 60-83. Also see Tallgren (2014), supra 
note 26.  
28Anderson (2009), supra note 2, p. 357. Structural implications of ICL can also be explored through a political 
economy perspective. For example, see T. Krever, ‘Ending impunity? Eliding political economy in international 
criminal law’, U. Mattei & J. D. Haskell (eds), Research Handbook on Political Economy and Law 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2015), 298-314.  
29 C. Stahn, Evolution, Revolution or New Culture? The Changing Anatomy of International Criminal Justice 
(and Some of its Curiosities) 15 International Criminal Law Review (2015) 1122-1137, p. 1127. 
No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it and 
give it meaning… Once understood in the context of the narratives that give it meaning, law 
becomes not merely a system of rules to be observed, but a world in which we live.30 
This socialising function of law and narrative accounts for why understanding the background 
understandings about ICL becomes crucial. As Cover notes, narratives are both moral and structured 
by time, with a beginning and a (projected) end: ‘every narrative is insistent in its demand for its 
prescriptive point, its moral’.31 This is clear for ICL too, where its moral imperative of firstly ending 
impunity through criminal trials so as to lessen and then eliminate future atrocities, is hard to 
dislodge.32 Such a narrative account of ICL’s purpose then structures the way a history of law as 
progress retells ICL’s evolution as the seductive embrace of ever more norms and courts to ensure 
that ICL proves that history need not be repeated.33 An emphasis too on institutions, especially 
courts, prescribes the work for international criminal lawyers as largely doctrinal support for 
normative evolution and enforcement.34 Such a narrative then radically limits our understanding of 
what counts as ‘criminal’, ‘international’ and part of the professional practice of the field. Sarah 
Nouwen makes such a point most keenly in her reflection on the nature of qualitative fieldwork 
about the ICC where typically those ‘receiving’ ICL in Africa are understood to be outside the 
scholarly consideration of ICL.35 Thus, dominant ICL narratives frame who and what remains inside 
and outside of the purview of ICL as scholarship and practice. 36 The contributions from Tallgren and 
Banham make such a point through their consideration of ‘alternative’ materials and texts for ICL 
research.  
Although it is not possible to step outside of the narrative frame that we live in, self-reflexivity at 
least allows us to explore how such narratives give shape to particular scholarly cultures and 
practices. Thus, a typical piece of writing within ICL begins within the frame of ICL positive rules and 
seeks to clarify them in pursuit of the broader ICL telos of ending impunity. A critical or 
interdisciplinary consideration of ICL though would not start here. For example, another way would 
be to start an analysis by considering the nature of the personnel populating and perpetuating the 
field of ICL.37 This sociological sensibility informs the accounts of Christensen and Dezalay as well as 
                                                          
30 R. M. Cover, ‘The Supreme Court, 1982 Term -- Foreword: Nomos and Narrative’ 97 Harvard Law Review 
(1983-1984) 4, pp. 4-5. 
31 Ibid., 5. 
32 Koskenniemi notes the way in which many international lawyers view international law as possessing an 
‘inbuilt moral direction’: M. Koskenniemi, ‘Law, Teleology and International Relations: An Essay in 
Counterdisciplinarity’ 26International Relations (2011) 2-34, pp. 4.  
33 See Baars who analyses four dominant narratives within ICL: G. Baars, ‘The Making of an International 
Criminal Law’, C. Schwoebel (ed.), Critical Approaches to International Criminal Law (Abingdon, Routledge, 
2014) pp. 196-218.  
34 This is never a simple process, however, as Koller points out that the international criminal lawyer typically 
struggles with a paradox: ‘The cosmopolitan identity calls out for a tribunal to reaffirm the cosmopolitan 
community against the individual aggressor. The legalist identity proceeds, however, on the basis that for a fully 
fair trial the defendant must be able to question any assumption underlying the trial, including introducing the 
idea of long-standing, if not intractable, incompatibility among communities.’ Koller, supra note 26, pp. 1064-
1065.  
35 S. Nouwen, ‘“As You Set out for Ithaka”: Practical, Epistemological, Ethical, and Existential Questions about 
Socio-Legal Empirical Research in Conflict’ 27 Leiden Journal of International Law (2014) 227-260. Also see 
M. Drumbl, ‘Toward a Criminology of International Crimes’ 19 Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 
(2003) 263-282. 
36 On ICL’s purview, see M. Burgis-Kasthala, ‘An Arresting Event: Assassination within the Purview of 
International Criminal Law’, C Schwoebel, Critical Approaches to International Criminal Law: An Introduction 
(Abingdon, Routledge, 2014), pp.246-263. 
37 On the nature of the ICL scholarly field, see S Vasilev, ‘On Trajectories and Destinations of International 
Criminal Law Scholarship’ 28 Leiden Journal of International Law (2015) 701-716.  
Jarvis, who all point to the particular professional agendas and trajectories that have come to shape 
ICL (in particular, compare the different institutional and professional histories of the ICTY and the 
ICC in Jarvis’ and Dezalay’s contributions). While Christensen notes broad trends in the professional 
ICL field through a systematic study of the biographies of its scholars, Jarvis offers an 
autobiographical account as illustrative of the field’s evolution.  
 
4. Towards Interdisciplinarity? 
Invocations of interdisciplinarity are increasingly de rigueur within the academy where funding 
sources favour research projects boasting innovative and collaborative approaches.38 Within the 
discipline of law per se whether at the behest of grant monies or otherwise, there are regular calls 
for interdisciplinary approaches to law. ICL is no exception with a growing body of work seeking to 
draw on other disciplines and forge links between ICL and scholars outside the field writing about 
ICL, especially ICTs. Often calls for interdisciplinarity do little more than remain grounded in one 
discipline while dabbling in the theory and methods of another.39 Thus, we can think of 
interdisciplinary endeavours along a spectrum beginning with dabbling in other disciplines (perhaps, 
best understood as multidisciplinary)40 and stretching all the way to near synthesis between ICL and 
another discipline so as to create a new discipline. The nature of research within a discipline is 
always evolving and so what can be understood as interdisciplinary at one moment need not be so 
at another, as instead, this transitional quest will often lead to full integration of certain 
interdisciplinary approaches.41 Accordingly, some scholars simply begin their inquiry of ICL with not 
only doctrinal, but social, historical and criminological tools without necessarily classifying their work 
as interdisciplinary. We can also think about the way in which the dominant disciplinary frame of ICL 
shapes the research agendas of non-legal scholars. For example, ICL has increasingly come to be 
understood by ICL scholars and practitioners as concerned exclusively with the ‘core’ crimes of the 
Rome Statute. This is closely followed in much of the criminological literature that fails to question 
the presumption that such crimes are the most heinous and the most serious across the globe.42   
We can categorise most interdisciplinary ICL work as an attempt to broaden the research agenda of 
the field itself beyond traditional doctrinal perspectives that do not question an internal point of 
view about the law.43 For Koskenniemi this would entail research that is no longer properly ‘legal’ as 
law is a craft concerned with interpretation of rules. The social implications of such rules are also 
relevant, but what is key is to remain grounded – or disciplined – in the normative and authoritative 
force of legal rules in social and political life. Social sciences do not treat law in this normative way 
and hence, the difficulty of performing truly interdisciplinary work.44  
                                                          
38 Vick, supra note 10, p. 171 
39 Vick, supra note 10, p. 192. 
40 On the difference between multidisciplinary and interdisciplinarity, see Tallgren’s contribution to the special 
issue as well as M. McCann, ‘Dr Strangelove (Or: How I learned to stop worrying and love methodology)’ 41 
Law, Politics and Society (2008) 19-59, p. 50. 
41 Vick, supra note 10. 
42 For example, see D. L. Rothe & C. W. Mullins, ‘Toward a Criminology of International Criminal Law: An 
Integrated Theory of International Criminal Violations’ 33 International Journal of Comparative and Applied 
Criminal Justice (2009) 97-118.  
43 In particular, critical approaches to international law, as discussed in Christensen’s contribution in this issue. 
Generally, see C. Schwoebel (ed.), Critical Approaches to International Criminal Law: An Introduction 
(Abingdon, Routledge, 2014), 
44 ‘Interdisciplinary vocabularies of “scholarship” and “science” miss what for most international lawyers is the 
most obvious aspect of our trade: namely, its craft-likeness, its being above all a practice. International law is 
Perhaps then, it is best to characterise research beyond ICL doctrine not as ICL, but as International 
Criminal Justice (ICJ). For Roberts and McMillan, ICJ research would require a range of specialisms 
and disciplinary backgrounds.45 Often extant ICJ research engages with methodologies found in the 
social sciences, whether quantitative or qualitative. Typically, such work is qualitative in nature, but 
there are some quantitative examples46 and perhaps this is one area of potential development as 
numerous critical scholars have argued that ICL’s grand claim such as that ending impunity will end 
or at least reduce atrocity crimes,47 has yet to be systematically tested.48 Extra-disciplinary 
methodologies however do not necessarily entail a rethinking of dominant ICL concerns;49 they can 
be used to reinforce existing frameworks and agendas. The extent to which a scholarly field is open 
to challenge is reflective of its own self-confidence and maturity. ICL is no longer new, yet the vast 
majority of its practitioners and scholars remain disinterested in opening the field up to new forms 
of inquiry, such as engaging with film.50 We hope this special issue will demonstrate the rich 
possibilities available whether through multi-disciplinary, interdisciplinary or extra-disciplinary 






                                                          
not a social science. It is not a (theoretical) science at all – that is to say, it does not operate on the basis of 
demonstrable, even less  empirical truths, nor with ideas about moral goodness. Legal ‘truth’ or ‘goodness’ 
is concerned with what Panu Minkkinen calls the correctness of the legal decision. This is a product of legal 
practice, argument and persuasion, not its precondition.’ Koskenniemi (2011), supra note 32, p. 19.  
45 Roberts and McMillan (2003), supra note 11, p. 316.  
46 See Christensen’s article in this issue.  
47 Drumbl makes this point in particular regarding the effects of international sentencing: M Drumbl, ‘Collective 
Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of Mass Atrocity’ 99 Northwestern University Law 
Review (2005) 539.  
48 Nouwen (2014), supra note 35, pp. 229-230. Cf. Stahn who argues that ‘Not all of…[international criminal 
justice’s] effects can be empirically measured or explained.’ Stahn (2015), supra note 29, p. 1127. For a social 
science consideration of ICC deterrence achievements, see K. Cronin-Furman, ‘Managing Expectations: 
International Criminal Trials and the Prospects for Deterrence of Mass Atrocity 7 International Journal of 
Transitional Justice (2013) 434-454. For an evaluation of the ICTY’s ability to establish the facts for the wider 
population affected, Milanovic draws on social psychology: M. Milanovic, ‘The Impact of the ICTY on the 
former Yugoslavia: an anticipatory postmortem’ 110 American Journal of International Law (2016) 233-259. 
49 For an example of a recent quantitative study on ICL that takes the parameters of the field as given: S. 
Manley, ‘Referencing Patterns at the International Criminal Court’ 27European Journal of International Law 
(2016) 191-214.  
50 But see I. Tallgren, ‘The Sensibility and Sense of International Criminal Law’ 13 European Journal of 
International Law (2002) 561-595; and D. Joyce & G. Simm, ‘Zero Dark Thirty: international law, film and 
representation’ 3 London Review of International Law (2015) 295-318. 
